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Abstract: This paper presents general strategies for cyber war gaming of Cyber-Physical 
Systems (CPSs) that are used for cyber security research at the U.S. Army Research 
Laboratory (ARL). Since Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and other 
CPSs are operational systems, it is difficult or impossible to perform security experiments on 
actual systems. The authors describe how table-top strategy sessions and realistic, live CPS 
war games are conducted at ARL. They also discuss how the recorded actions of the war 
game activity can be used to test and validate cyber-defence models, such as game-theoretic 
security models. 
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Introduction 
It is commonly known that many Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs)—which include Industrial 
Control Systems (ICSs), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and 
“things” in the so-called Internet of Things (IOT)—are often vulnerable to cyber threats. For 
example, the very well known STUXNET attack targeted nuclear power plant centrifuges in 
Iran. Similar cyber (and physical) attacks on CPS equipment could very well target the 
United States’ power grid, the control systems of large water dams, and even people, since 
wearable CPSs are becoming more and more popular. Even though the hardware controlling 
CPSs are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, they remain relatively unprotected from many potential 
adversaries. In an attempt to educate operators, owners and users of CPSs, the ARL recruits 
players for red (attack) and blue (defence) teams and conducts CPS war games in an 
environment as close to realistic as possible. The decisions (moves) of the war game players 
are recorded so that a better understanding of how security models may allow useful 
assessments and/or predictions of attacks against currently operating SCADA and other CPS 
systems. This paper discusses current results and future plans for CPS war gaming in the 
following subsections. 
 
SCADA and Industrial Control Systems 
An Industrial Control System (ICS) is a generic term for a combined system of electrical and 
mechanical devices and processes that automatically control the operation or one or more 
physical machines. Machines can be as simple as a self-service gasoline filling pump system, 
or as complex as a complete robotic assembly line in a vehicle production plant.  
 
A Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is a specific type of ICS that 
usually controls many machines separated by relatively large distances (Sullivan, Luiff & 
Colbert 2016). The key discriminator which separates an ICS from an Information 
Technology (IT) system is that an ICS monitors or interacts with something physical in the 
		
	
real world. Previously, ICSs were isolated; however, due to demand for greater productivity 
and efficiency, ICSs and IT enterprise networks are now being inter-connected. This new 
trend exposes ICS devices to many new threats they would have never encountered when 
previously isolated. 
 
Error! Reference source not found., below, depicts a typical manufacturing plant with its 
ICS connected to a corporate IT network. The ICS consists of the Supervisory Control and 
Basic Control layers and field bus networks connected to plant sensors and other physical 
devices. In this example, a corporate Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the edge of the corporate 
network offers some protection against cyber-attacks from external networks. However, 
many network attack vectors remain, putting the physical machines (sensors and equipment 
in the figure) at risk. In many cases, physical machines in ICS and SCADA systems are 
critically important for human sustenance, such as power switches and transformers in the US 
electric grid. Automated processes in the ICS are programmed into and controlled by ICS 
hardware devices such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and are consequently 
monitored by a human operator, who manages Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs). A recent 
summary of cyber security issues and method of SCADA and ICS systems was written by 
Colbert and Kott (2016).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Notional ICS and corporate IT network architecture 
 
 
War Gaming 
War gaming has been used to refine aspects of warfare since the 5th century B.C. when the 
ancient Chinese general and philosopher Sun Tzu documented military strategies in The art 
of war (Sawyer & Sawyer 2007). War gaming methods are now used in business and military 
training as essential elements of developing strategic leaders (Horn 2011; Curry & Perla 
2011; McCown 2005). Without risking a company’s reputation, stock value, or customers’ 
confidence, corporate cyber defenders can test their cyber play books and identify needed 
		
	
skills or new processes in a safe and controlled environment. A realistic war game can be an 
immersive learning tool where players can practice making decisions in real time and can see 
the effects immediately. Modern cyber war games are played between cyber attacker in a ‘red 
team’ and cyber defenders in a ‘blue team’ and are organised around a business scenario in 
which teams and players receive awards for their actions. They are necessarily structured to 
simulate a real attack so that the defenders can exercise and refine their defence strategy 
methods for potential future engagements (for example, Bailey, Kaplan & Weinberg 2012). 
War games are also very useful for uncovering ‘black swans’ or unforeseen gaps in current 
cyber defences (Perla & McGrady 2011). Knowledge learned in war games is dependent 
upon the ability of the game moderators to simulate real-world network and processes. 
 
Table-Top War Gaming at ARL 
In order to develop strategies for defending SCADA systems, a full-day Table-Top exercise 
was performed at ARL in 2014. A SCADA system named AQUA was analysed during the 
exercise. AQUA is a notional Army SCADA system representative of an Army production 
system. The process diagram for AQUA is shown in Error! Reference source not found., 
below. AQUA produces high-quality meals for soldiers and consists of six manufacturing 
processes indicated in the figure. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Process map of the AQUA ICS 
 
The plant network diagram for AQUA is shown in Error! Reference source not found., 
below. It consists of 6 PLCs, several Windows workstations, a Closed-Circuit Television 
(CCTV) system, and a wireless network for tablet computers. Technicians use the tablet 
computers to access the Human Machine Interface (HMI) displays using Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and to read machinery documentation in Portable Document 
Format (PDF). The plant network is not connected to the corporate network or the Internet. 
The HMIs and PLCs transmit and receive the commonly used ModBus-transmission control 
		
	
protocol (TCP) communication protocol. The AQUA system is air-gapped from the corporate 
network and the Internet, as indicated in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 3: Network diagram of the AQUA plant network 
 
The Table-Top activity was conducted in a war gaming scenario in which a red team would 
formulate attacks, and a blue team would attempt to mitigate those attacks. The teams were 
composed of government and contract workers from ARL. In general, the network-based 
attacks proposed by the red team were defendable, often by simple security measures that 
were unfortunately not already installed in the AQUA system. Some specific areas of follow-
up research and development were proposed for SCADA intrusion detection, such as a Layer-
2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and anomaly-based network detectors. 
 
An information packet (Colbert et al. 2015a) was given to all red and blue team participants 
before the exercise began. It provided background material for those not familiar with 
SCADA systems, a discussion of the differences between IT enterprise networks and 
SCADA networks. Technical information about the AQUA system was also provided in the 
packet. 
 
The general goal of the Table-Top exercise was to generate enough discussion so that general 
gaps in security measures could be identified. The ARL Sustaining Base Network Assurance 
Branch (SBNAB) and Network Security Branch (NSB) support research and development 
activities of IT enterprise IDS systems and most of the game participants from these branches 
were familiar with those IDS efforts. As such, improvements to SCADA security were 
typically framed in terms of IDS plug-in modules. Complete details of the exercise are 
documented in Colbert et al. (2015b). Some general conclusions from the exercise follow.  
 
• The SCADA network should be regarded in the same manner that a government 
classified network is regarded. While the system may not be classified, the same 
		
	
measures should be applied: tight physical security; zero or highly restricted wireless 
access; US Department of Defense (DoD) Security Technical Implementation 
Guidance (STIG) regulations should be applied when possible; firewalls should be in 
place to highly restrict traffic to and from critical network assets; and, appropriate 
policies and training should be created and enforced. 
• Two particular technology improvements were noted for follow-up research and 
development for IDS plug-in modules: 
o Anomaly-based network monitoring should be developed for HMI/PLC 
traffic. 
o Layer-2 traffic should be monitored for defending against attacks coming in 
below the Internet Protocol (IP) layer (Layer-3). This includes wireless traffic, 
which seems to be coming to more and more ‘protected’ networks, even 
classified government networks. 
• A considerable amount of development effort would be needed to develop new 
security capabilities for SCADA, and a considerable amount of maintenance effort 
would be needed by both network security analysts and plant operators to keep the 
new security tools calibrated, especially after changes are made in the plant network. 
A benefit of having a SCADA anomaly detector in place, however, is that all changes 
to the plant network would be immediately alarmed. 
• Since much SCADA hardware is not designed for cyber security, physical security 
often currently provides the main defence. Defence-in-depth is vitally important for 
an effective defence. Strong policies and employee training must be used, especially 
for alleviating insider threat. 
 
The 2014 Table-Top exercise provided an exceptional view of the technical and 
programmatic security issues in SCADA systems that could be followed up by hardware test 
bed experiments. ARL plans to continue to perform similar exercises in the future to better 
understand how ARL SCADA research should proceed and to better educate its personnel 
about ongoing problems and issues specific to different ICSs.  
 
It is important to note that while important general conclusions for improved security were 
found in the exercise, since each SCADA system is unique a dedicated Table-Top or other 
brainstorming activity would be needed if threats are to be identified and mitigated for 
specific systems. For the AQUA production line, poor network security proved to be a severe 
problem. Poor network security exists on many modern SCADA systems since they were 
originally designed for physical security protection in an isolated network environment. 
Consequently, most or all of the red team attacks from the Table-Top experiment would have 
been successful. However, a few simple network security improvements would have made 
the AQUA system significantly safer, such as removing the wireless access point and not 
using the default configuration for routers and switches.  
 
In general, pure network attacks against AQUA are defendable if the IT network section of 
the system is upgraded with appropriate security measures. However, there are non-IT 
network elements of the AQUA system that are more complicated to defend; PLCs are not 
built for network security and the Modbus TCP protocol does not use any authentication 
measures. 
 
Since SCADA systems are, overall, distinctly different from standard IT enterprise systems, 
network security analysts need to educate themselves and understand the intricacies of 
		
	
SCADA in order to guard them properly. Furthermore, for each SCADA installation, the 
analysts would need to understand the particular intricacies of the SCADA system being 
defended, since each SCADA system usually has very different types of hardware. This 
differs from IT enterprise systems, which typically run a limited number of operating systems 
and applications. Unlike SCADA systems, the underlying hardware in IT enterprise systems 
is much less relevant, since many or most of the vulnerabilities are software-oriented and 
already known. 
 
Live war gaming at ARL 
The objective of the war gaming activity on a real live SCADA system is to capture activities 
of cyber defenders as they protect a corporate and an ICS network as well as capture the 
actions of hackers as they try to halt automated processes. Afterwards, the captured activities 
are compared to a security model of the system to determine if the model algorithm can 
accurately predict actions of the cyber actors. 
 
In the planned live war game, a simulated corporate network and a SCADA system are 
monitored by a security operations centre while being attacked by hackers. Three teams of 
actors participate in the war game: 
 
• Red Team: threat actors who represent a mid-level of knowledge in penetrating 
networks. Red team members are not ‘script-kiddies’ nor do they have the resources 
of a nation-state; 
• Blue Team: security operations analysts who will monitor and defend the corporate 
network and the SCADA system operations; and, 
• White Team: neutral group that facilitates the war game. The white team provides 
the initial configuration of the corporate network and SCADA system, training (as 
needed), and monitors all activity of the game. The white team also adjudicates 
scoring of the red and blue teams. 
 
The mission of the red team is to compromise the availability of the SCADA system 
operation by stopping the automated process. The mission of the blue team is to monitor 
system status, maintain critical IT services in the corporate network, and maintain normal 
operations of the plant. At the conclusion of each war game event, the white team will 
capture all artefacts and archive the data for analysis. A post-war game meeting will be held 
to review the actions of each team and share lessons learned. 
 
Sample live war game scenario 
A specific sample live war game is described next, in which two companies manufacture 
competing smartphone products. Company ALPHA has a SCADA production line that is 
connecting to its corporate network and to the Internet. The ALPHA corporate network and 
smartphone production line system are protected by the blue team in the war game scenario. 
Company BETA has recently suffered a drop in smartphone sales and wishes to increase its 
revenue and dominate the market. Company BETA hires a team of hackers (the red team) to 
compromise the availability of the company ALPHA smartphone production line. Sample 
game play (schedule, rules, and point scoring system) for this war game are described next. 
 
War game schedule 
The blue team must design its network defences prior to the start of the war game. The white 
team will provide a read-ahead package to the blue team members one-to-two weeks before 
		
	
the war game begins. The read-ahead package will contain technical information about the 
system, such as: 
 
• Initial network topology of the simulated corporate and ICS network for the war 
game; 
• Lists of each physical and Virtual Machine (VM) used in the war game along with 
their respective Operating System (OS) and software;  
• Make and model of the PLC(s) which operate the simulated automated process; and, 
• Additional hardware such as firewalls, switches, or routers that are available to the 
blue team for enhancing the system security. 
 
The blue team members may bring additional tools or software they would like to install. Red 
team members may also bring their own tools and software. Red team members will not 
receive the read-ahead package. They will only receive general information about the war 
game play provided by the white team in the kickoff meeting. 
 
The war game will be executed in two events (Event 1 and Event 2), which are identical 
except for the fact that the blue team has additional SCADA security training in Event 2. 
There will be two distinct blue teams (Blue Team #1 and Blue Team #2) as well as two 
distinct red teams (Red Team #1 and Red Team #2). Each event will be conducted over a 3-
day period. The white team will meet with the blue and red teams in advance of the war game 
to answer questions and coordinate building access. 
 
The timeline for Event 1 is illustrated in Figure 4, below. On Day 1, both teams will meet for 
a short introductory kickoff meeting. Blue Team #1 will then have two hours to install 
software or hardware to protect the simulated corporate and ICS networks. An additional 
hour will be spent with the white team discussing and verifying the mitigations. The white 
team will then commence the war game and the blue team will monitor and attempt to defend 
the ALPHA SCADA system for the next 21 hours while the red team attempts to compromise 
its availability. During game play, activities of each player as well as network packet data 
		
	
will be captured by the white team. Each red and blue team member will keep notes on the 
actions taken to validate point scoring. 
Figure 4: Event 1 timeline 
After 24 hours of game play (Day 2), the white team will stop the game play for Event 1. 
Each player will provide notes describing his or her actions to the white team. The white 
team will then archive game play data such as network packet captures, logs, and capture of 
screen video. The white team will have 24 hours to complete the data capture and archiving 
of the event. 
 
On Day 3, all red and blue team members will be invited to a two-hour technical exchange 
meeting during which each team will share insights and information about their strategies and 
provide feedback to the white team. Point totals will be share and game prizes will be 
awarded. The white team will brief their analysis of the collected game play data and will 
discuss conclusions of the war game. Lessons learned will be recorded by the white team. 
 
Event 2 
Event 2 is conducted in a similar manner to Event 1 with one change. Before starting the 
event (on Day 4), the white team will provide an in-depth security brief on general methods 
of SCADA security and specific applications for the ALPHA production-line system. This 
change is performed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of blue team SCADA security 
training. Many cyber defence security workers are well trained in IT enterprise security, but 
not necessarily in SCADA security. The three-day structure of Event 1 shown in Figure 4 is 
then repeated for Event 2 during days 4, 5, and 6, respectively. A new set of red and blue 
teams are chosen using the same team selection criteria used for Event 1. 
 
Sample war game play  
The red and blue teams are provided with game rules and objectives used for scoring in the 
initial kickoff meeting. Violations of game rules create point penalties for the respective 
teams. A preliminary set of rules and a sample point scoring system are given below. 
 
General game structure 
In this example exercise, the white team randomly selects members of the red and blue teams 
from a larger pool of volunteers. Players in event 1 are not allowed to participate in event 2. 
Members from the red and blue teams will nominate their own team captain. In order to 
accomplish their strategy, red and blue team members are allowed to use their own hardware 
and software during the game activity. The red team may use cyber-attacks or physical 
attacks as they see fit, since both are viable in a realistic setting. Game play is dictated to the 
teams using specific rules of conduct and point scoring, such as those listed in Table 1, 
below. 
 
		
	
Game Rule Description Violation Penalty Points 
1 A competitor can participate in only one war game event 
5 points deducted from the 
team for each person who 
attempts to compete in both 
war game events 
2 
Before competition begins, the red team may 
not eavesdrop or surreptitiously observe the 
blue team configure the war game network 
20 points deducted from the 
red team 
3 
During competition, red and blue team 
members may not visit their opponents’ area 
unless approved by the white team 
20 points deducted from the 
offending team 
 
Table 1: Red and blue team game rules of conduct 
 
 
Sample Point Scoring 
The white team will track game scores. Negative points are levied for violations of game 
rules and positive points are awarded for achievements. In this sample game, each team has 
knowledge of its current score, but it does not have knowledge of the other team’s score. 
Table 2, below, lists sample point values for each achievement scored by the blue team, as 
well as the criterion for award and the award validation method.  
 
 
Achievement Point Value Award Criterion Validation Method 
1 
5 points for 
each critical 
service per 
hour  
Critical service is 
normally running 
White team will connect to each 
service to verify it is operational 
2 10 points Stopping red team intrusion 
Blue team shows the white team that 
an intruder was present and the blue 
team’s action prevented new 
connections from the intruder. The 
blue team must show that the intruder 
is being prevented from reconnecting 
by showing log entries to the white 
team. 
 
Table 2: Blue team point scoring system 
 
 
The red team gains points for having presence on the corporate network or the ALPHA 
SCADA system, disabling vital ALPHA corporate network services (for example, email, 
web, Voice Over Internet Protocol [VOiP] telephony), or compromising a critical plant 
process (see Table 3, below). The red team automatically wins the competition if they 
completely halt the smartphone production line. 
 
		
	
Achievement Point Value Award Criterion Validation Method 
1 
5 points for 
each critical 
service stopped 
Red team stops a 
Company Blue 
corporate critical 
service (for 
example, web, 
email, etc.) 
White team will try to access the 
service. Points are awarded if the 
service is down for 10 minutes. 
2 10 points 
Red team gains a 
remote shell on a 
Company Blue 
host 
Red team shows the white team a 
screen capture video of a remote shell 
session and displays the IP address of 
the remote host. 
3 10 points 
Red team has 
administrative 
privileges on a 
Company Blue 
host or network 
element 
Red team executes a command on the 
host that requires administrative 
rights. Red team shows the white 
team a screen capture of the admin 
command executing. 
4 1 point for each IP address 
Red team learns IP 
address of a host 
on the ICS 
network 
Red team sends IP address to white 
team to validate. 
5 Infinite Company Blue’s ICS process stops 
White team witnesses the ICS process 
has stopped. 
 
Table 3: Red team point scoring system 
 
 
Recording war game activity 
In this example, the mission of the white team is to record game play activity so that human 
actions can later be compared with predictions of computer security models, and the utility of 
the security models can be evaluated and hopefully improved. To accomplish a uniform 
sampling of actors, members of the red and blue teams will be chosen from academia, 
government institutions, or companies and team selection methods will be the same for both 
Event 1 and Event 2. As in a real scenario, blue team members can provide additional 
security measures during game play as needed. Red team members have a minimum amount 
of a priori technical information about the ALPHA system. Acquiring useful information for 
their attacks is part of the red team strategy. 
 
Network traffic on the war game network will be recorded by the white team. The white team 
will also record strategic actions by red and blue team members, hopefully with assistance 
		
	
from the actual performers. After completing Events 1 and 2, the white team will present the 
game results at an open meeting and all teams will discuss lessons learned. Each team will 
have an opportunity to present its strategy and observations as well as recommendations for 
improving the war game. Point summaries will be discussed and awards will be given to the 
winning team. As mentioned, the purpose of having two events is to measure the effect of 
providing more in-depth training to the blue team for the second event. 
 
Post-game activities: comparison with models 
After the white team records game play activity, a computer security model will be used to 
analyse game play based on the initial system configuration and sample blue and red team 
strategies. This post-game activity is intended to test the validity of security models so that 
they can be improved for practical use as a security tool. 
 
Next, a sample game-theoretic security model is described in which three games occur 
simultaneously at the physical layer, the cyber layer, and the management layer. This model 
assumes that all game players act rationally to optimize gain and an equilibrium strategy can 
be computed. For example, in the cyber game, the encounter between attacker and defender is 
described by a zero-sum game and rational moves of the two players are defined by saddle-
points (Nash equilibria points) once the costs and awards of the two teams are known for all 
game strategies. 
 
A sample cyber game (one of the three) is described next in which an attacker enters the 
attack surface and penetrates a series of layers guarded by the defender before arriving at the 
target (disabling the plant). The attacker devises a set  strategies {  where  is the 
attack strategy space, where the attack strategies are identified by index . Likewise, the 
defender has developed a set of  strategies {  where  is the defence strategy space 
and  is the defence strategy index. The sample model assumes that both attacker and 
defender have complete knowledge of the system and can consequently determine each 
other’s strategies. The defender strategies are accomplished by selecting specific subsets of 
cyber-defence mitigations {  where  is the set of all mitigations, and  is the 
mitigation index. There are  layers that the attacker needs to penetrate. These layers are 
identified by the index . 
 
There are costs for both the attacker and the defender for each specific strategy tuple . 
That is, given an attack strategy  and a defence strategy , the attacker suffers a cost  to 
accomplish his goal and the defender spends a cost  to deploy his or her defence strategy.  
 
Finally, given a strategy choice , the attacker is assumed to penetrate layer  with 
probability  , or  in shorthand notation. If the attacker penetrates all  layers, he 
or she reaches the target  and obtains a benefit . 
 
It is assumed that when the attacker gains benefit 𝑏, the defender loses an equivalent value of 
his or her assets, so that the defender strives to keep the relevant portion (𝑏) of his or her 
assets. 
 
The attacker and defender expecting utility 𝑢! depends on the benefit 𝑏, the probability of 
penetrating all layers 𝑃!,!" =  𝑝!,!"!!!!! , and expended costs 𝐶!,!". For the attacker:  
 
		
	
(1a) 𝑢! 𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,! = 𝑏 𝑝! 𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,!!!!!!  − 𝐶! 𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,! , or, in shorthand notation 
 
(1b) 𝑢!,!" =  𝑏 𝑃!,!" −  𝐶!,!" 
 
Likewise, for the defender: 
 
(1c) 𝑢! 𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,! = 𝑏[1−  𝑝! 𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,! ]!!!!!  − 𝐶! 𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,! , or, in shorthand 
notation 
 
(1d) 𝑢!,!" =  𝑏 (1−  𝑃!,!")−  𝐶!,!" 
One game equilibrium can be calculated using a Stackelberg model in which the defender is 
the leader and the attacker is the follower. To choose his or her initial strategy 𝑠!∗ , the 
defender will seek to minimize the damages to his or her assets and the costs of defending his 
or her assets using an affordable defender strategy, which is equivalent to maximizing his or 
her utility 𝑢!,!". That is:  
 
 (2a) 𝑠!∗ = argmax !!,! ∊!!  !!,! ∊!!!   𝑢!(𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,!), 
 
where 𝑆!! ⊂  𝑆! is the subset of affordable defender strategies. 
 
After the defender chooses strategy 𝑠!∗ , the attacker selects his attack strategy 𝑠!∗, that 
maximizes his utility 𝑢!,!": 
 
 (2b) 𝑠!∗ = argmax!!,!  𝑢!(𝑠!,! , 𝑠!∗) 
 
The defender can then assess the probability 𝑃!∗(𝑠!,! , 𝑠!,!) that the attack reaches the target T 
by calculating 
 
(2c)  𝑃!∗ = 𝑝! 𝑠!∗ , 𝑠!∗  !!!!! . 
 
A second Stackelberg equilibrium can also be calculated by allowing the attacker to move 
first, followed by the defender. 
 
While these equilibrium points are interesting mathematical entities, the simple game-
theoretical model here makes many assumptions that were not necessarily true in a real war 
game of human teams of defenders and attackers in our December 2016 “Terra” cyber-
physical war game held at ARL (Colbert et al. 2017). Some important differences between 
our simple model and a more realistic attack scenario are: 
 
• The attacker entity may be a group of people that work 8-hour shifts around the clock, 
not a single person with a single utility function;  
		
	
• The attacker entity may be a group of people that has a leader that manages people 
that execute the attacks. The group will likely have members that do not take direction 
well from the manager;  
• The attacker (and/or defender) may not know how to navigate his or her strategy 
space because of unknown information (rules) at the beginning of the game;  
• As information is learnt by both teams, the game rules and utilities may change; 
• Similarly, system vulnerabilities and, consequently, game rules may be dynamic; 
• The actors on the defence and attacking side may not make decisions according to a 
known utility function; for example, a nation state may take actions independent of 
the costs, and in a war game a red-team member may be more interested in displaying 
his or her prowess rather than helping his or her team; 
• Zero-sum is an interesting concept for finding solutions, but is not realistic; 
• Government politics or polices may change during a nation-state attack, which 
effectively modifies the rules of the game;  
• Attackers and defenders do not always act rationally. In a group setting, the attacker 
entity’s decisions, effectively made by a number of people, may be chaotic or very 
difficult to model easily with a probabilistic model such as instance-based learning 
(Gonzalez, Lerch & Lebiere 2003); and, 
•  As a real-life security situation unfolds, a series of (illogical) moves are made on 
each side as the (dynamic) game evolves. If the uncertainty of each move is too large, 
the solution (for example, a saddle point in strategy space) might not be useful to a 
system owner. 
 
These issues should be considered and accommodated at some reasonable level before game-
theoretical models can be developed into good attacker-defender security models for war 
game or real actors. 
 
Conclusion 
This sample cyber framework describes a simple game-theoretic approach in which both 
attacker and defender have complete knowledge of the system, can infer all strategies of their 
opponents, and act in a rational manner toward maximizing their utility (minimizing their 
costs). Variations on this cyber model will be needed to accommodate deviations from ideal 
(rational) actors. 
 
As mentioned earlier, SCADA and ICS systems are not merely a cyber network. They are 
affected by the state of the physical system attached to the network. Attacks focused on the 
physical system can penetrate the cyber network. As physical system changes occur on a 
much faster timescale than the cyber game, it can be modelled as a differential game and 
solved simultaneously with the cyber game to create a two-game security model, (Zhu & 
Basar 2015). In addition, the plant operator and the supervisor exist in an important and 
distinct management layer and their actions strongly influence both the cyber and physical 
layers. The policies and procedures for plant operations also play a part in the management 
layer game. The plant operator monitors critical elements of the plant processes and makes 
optimal choices—within given policy constraints—to maintain system operability. 
 
To best accommodate influences from these three layers, a three-game model is proposed in 
which defender and attacker play in the cyber regime, physical control devices and 
perturbations (intentional or accidental) play in the physical regime, and operator and plant 
		
	
management play in an abstracted management layer. All three regimes and all players can 
affect each other in this complex, three-game model. 
 
The amount of information revealed to the players is an important determinant in the outcome 
of the game. Assuming costs and behaviour can be modelled well, the attacker will often not 
have complete knowledge of the three regimes when they begin their attacks, as the security 
model may assume. In fact, in ARL’s two war game events, the red team does not have 
complete knowledge of the system when it begins game play. It may have done some 
reconnaissance work, but will be missing important pieces of information when it initiates 
attack strategies. This lack of information will affect the team’s path taken through attack 
space. 
 
Clearly, the purpose of the post-game activities, and arguably, the war game itself, is to 
identify significant deficiencies in the security model so that it can be improved for practical 
use. By adding more complexity to the model and recalculating results, an improved SCADA 
security model can be developed and validated using recorded actions such as those from this 
sample SCADA cyber war game. 
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